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HOURS AND EMPLOYMENT
HANS BREMS
Abstract
With real wage rate and hours given to them by collective agree-
ment, firms are assumed to supply whatever output is most profitable
to them. With a well-functioning capital market such supply will
create its own demand. Using the empirically robust Cobb-Douglas
production function the paper finds that a compensated shortening of
hours of men and machines alike will have the same unfavorable effect
upon employment as a direct increase of the hourly real wage rate. A
compensated shortening of hours of men but not of machines will have a
less unfavorable effect.
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HOURS AND EMPLOYMENT
ARBEITSZEIT UND BESCHXFTIGUNG
By Hans Breras , Urbana-Charapaign, USA
WENN'T Abend ward,
Und still de Welt un still dat Hart;
Wenn mod up't Knee di liggt de Hand,
Un ut din Husklock an de Wand
Du horst den Parpendikelslag,
De nich to Woort keera over Dag
Theodor Storm (1817-1888), "An Klaus Groth," Forster (1957: 363)
1. Hours
Hours of work per man per year display an unmistakable downward
trend, very similar between the United States and Germany: Accordint
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to Maddison (1987: 686), over the period 1870-1984 the German hours
of work, per man per year declined from 2,941 to 1,676, and the United
States hours from 2,964 to 1,632.
The historical parallel between our countries, then, is close
enough. But in the mid-eighties an American observer of the German
scene noticed a lively public debate on an issue that in the United
States has remained a nonissue, i.e., shorter hours. Shorter hours
were seen as a cure for unemployment, thus reviving the durable
fallacy that a given pile of work, is waiting to be done, and the
shorter the hours the more men it would take to do it: if seven men
working for five days @ 8 hours can dig a ditch, how many men would it
take to dig it in five days @ 7 hours? Back in junior high school
that is how most of us were introduced to algebra.
2. A Simple Model
Scholars know better and have already said so, not the least in
the present journal. All my own modest contribution can hope to do
is to reduce the issue to its essence and to express that essence in
simple mathematics.
The first thing to do is to abandon the Keynesi3n notion that
demand always creates its own supply. Instead, with real wage rate
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and hours given to them by collective agreement, let firms respond by
supplying whatever physical output is most profitable to the indi-
vidual firm. With a well-functioning capital market such supply will
always create its own demand: a flexible rate of interest will be the
equilibrating variable between saving and investment. In that case
the propensities to consume or save will be of no direct consequence
for the aggregate demand for output. A higher propensity to save will
simply reduce one use, i.e., consumption, of output but expand
another, i.e., investment, by as much as Smith [1776 (1805: 78-79)]
and Ricardo 2 [1815-1823 (1951, IV: 179-180)] said it would. The New
Classical economics is indeed classical!
The second thing to do is to use the empirically robust Cobb-
Douglas production function having the constant elasticity of substi-
tution between labor and capital equaling one. With great ease such a
function will handle the practically important distinction between a
shortening of hours of men alone and a shortening of hours of men and
machines alike.
Let us use the following notation.
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3. Variables
L = employment, number of men
P = price
w = money wage rate, dollars per man-hour
X = physical output
4. Parameters
a = joint factor productivity
a E elasticity of physical output with respect to labor
8 s elasticity of physical output with respect to capital stock.
h = hours of work, per year of men and machines alike
h. e hours of work per man per year
h = hours of operation per machine per year
S = physical capital stock, number of machines
The subscript i refers to the ith firm.
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5. Men and Machines Work. Same Hours Per Year
Consider first the simple case that men and machines alike work, h
hours per year.
We must begin at the firm level and write the production function
of the ith firm common to all n firms:
X. = a(hL.) a (hS.) 6 = ahL.V 6 (1)
i li li
where < a < 1, < 8 < 1, a + 8 = 1, and a is what growth measurement
[Maddison (1987: 658)] calls "joint factor productivity." In (1) the
elasticity of physical output X. with respect to hours h per man or
machine per year is 1. The elasticity with respect to number of men
L. is a.
i
With a real wage rate w/P and hours h given to it by collective
agreement, the ith firm will maximize its profits by hiring man-hours
until in real terms the last man-hour costs as much as it contributes.
Under pure competition, then, the real wage rate equals the physical
marginal productivity of labor:
w 3X. 1 3X
—
-
= = a aL . S
.
( 2
)
P 3(hL. ) h 3L. L X
l l
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frora the right-hand side of which hours h have disappeared. Number of
men L. is raised to the power a - 1 = - 6. Raise both sides of (2) to
the power - 1/8, rearrange, and write number of men demanded as a
function of the hourly real wage rate w/P:
w
"1/B
L = (aa) 1/6 (-) S
P
easily aggregated into
-1/S
i /ft
w
L = (acO i/t3 (-) S (3)
where
n
L = EL.
i-1
L
n
S = IS
1-1 l
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6. Shorter Hours at Same Hourly Real Wage Rate
Because hours h appear nowhere in (3), its elasticity with respect
to them is
aiog l
S- = (4)
31og h
In other words, the number of men demanded L remains the same
regardless of the number of hours h. Puzzling? Not at all: in a
linearly homogeneous production function like our (1) physical mar-
ginal productivities of factors are known to depend solely upon the
factor proportion. Shortening the number of hours h for men and
machines alike will affect neither the factor proportion (hS.)/(hL.)
nor the phvsical marginal productivity of labor 9X./3(hL.). Since the11
hourly real wage rate is not affected either, the two can remain equal
at the same number of men L as before the shortening.
While employment L remains unaffected, physical output is seriously
affected by the shorter hours: the elasticity of physical output of
the firm (1) with respect to hours was seen to be 1. A 1 percent
shortening of hours, in other words, will reduce firm output by 1 per-
cent. There is indeed no given pile of work, waiting to be done!
7. A Higher Hourly Real Wage Rate at Same Hours
Because the hourly real wage rate w/P does appear in (3), the
real-wage-rate elasticity of employment is
91og L
(5)
31og
e
(w/P) 6
In other words, if 8 = 1/4 and the hourly real wage rate w/P is up
by 1 percent the number of men demanded L is down by 4 percent.
8. A Compensated Shortening of Hours of Men and Machines Alike
Now consider an increase in the hourly real wage rate in disguise:
shorten the hours h for men and machines alike but offer labor a com-
pensation for lost annual real income by letting the hourly real wage
rate vary in inverse proportion to hours h:
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W K
-«- (6)
P h
where K is a constant. The production function is still (1).
With a real wage rate w/P and hours h given to it by collective
agreement, the ith firm will again be hiring man-hours until in real
terms the last- man-hour costs as much as it contributes. As before,
then:
w K 3X. 1 3X.
— = — = = = aaL S
.
( 7
)
P h 3(hL.) h 3L. L X
i i
from the right-hand side, but not from the left-hand side, of which
hours h have disappeared. Number of men L. is raised to the power
a - 1 = - 3. Raise both sides of (7) to the power -1/8, rearrange,
and write number of men demanded as a function of hours of work per
man per year h
. , ,1/B, l/S^-l/S^
u . - Qaa ) h \ S
.
i l
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easily aggregated into
L - (aa) 1/3h 1/BK-1/6 S (8)
whose elasticity with respect to hours of work, per man per year is
81og L 1
— = - (9)
Slog h 8
e
In other words, if 8 = 1/4 and hours per man year h are shortened
by 1 percent the number of men demanded L is down by 4 percent. The
elasticities (5) and (9) are equal with opposite signs: the 1 percent
compensated shortening of hours has exactly the same effect upon
employment as a 1 percent direct increase of the hourly real wage
rate. The reason is easy to see: in a linearly homogeneous produc-
tion function like our (1) physical marginal productivities of factors
are known to depend solely upon the factor proportion. Shortening the
number of hours h for men and machines alike will affect neither the
factor proportion (hS.)/(hL.) nor the physical marginal productivity
of labor 8X./3(hL.). The only way to raise the latter to equality
with the new higher hourly real wage rate is to reduce employment L..
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9. A Compensated Shortening of Hours of Men But Not: of Machines
Finally consider the possibility that men and machines may work.
different hours per year, i.e., h. and h_ , respectively. The produc-
tion function of the ith firm will then be
X. = a(h L.) u (h_S.)
X L» X OX (10)
Here the elasticity of physical output X. with respect to hours
h per man per year is a. The elasticity with respect to number of
men L. is also a.
l
With this possibility we may consider an increase in the hourly
real wage rate in a different disguise: shorten the hours h. for men
but not the hours h for machines and, as before, offer labor a com-
pensation for lost annual real income by letting the hourly real wage
rate vary in inverse proportion to hours h :
w K
P h T
(ID
where K is a constant. The new production function is (10)
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With a real wage rate w/P and hours 11. given to it by collective
agreement, the ith firm will still be hiring man-hours until in real
terms the last man-hour costs as much as it contributes. Conse-
quent ly
:
w K 9X. 1 9X.
i 1 , a - 1T a - 1,, c ,3 /io\
— = — = = = a ah L. (h S. r (12)
P hT 3(h T L.) h T 3L.
X
L L 1 L 1
Here number of men L. is raised to the power a - 1 = - S. Raise
1
both sides of (12) to the power - 1/8, rearrange, and write number of
men demanded as a function of hours of work, per man per year 11 :
.
(
„,1/Zh 1/6 - l„-l/6. QL. = aa) h T K h_S.
1 L Si
easily aggregated into
.
( ,1/8, 1/8 - 1.-1/8, c ,,.,L = (aa) h K h S (1j)
whose elasticity with respect to hours of work per man per year is
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31og L 1
S— = -- 1 (14)
31og h. 3
°e L
In other words, if 8 = 1/4 and hours per man per year h are
shortened by 1 percent the number of men demanded L is down by only
3 percent. The elasticities (5) and (14) are not equal with opposite
signs: the 1 percent compensated shortening of hours no longer has
the same effect upon employment as a 1 percent direct increase of the
hourly real wage rate. The reason is easy to see: in a linearly
homogeneous production function like our (10) physical marginal
productivities of factors are known to depend solely upon the factor
proportion. Shortening the number of hours h^ of men but not the
number of hours h of machines will affect the factor proportion
(h_S
.
)/(h T L. ) and raise the physical marginal productivity of laborSiLi
3X./3(h.L.) some of the way towards equality with the new higher
X 1—1
hourly real wage rate. Only the rest of the way will require a cur-
tailment of employment L..
Such alleviation of the contractive effect upon employment will
require flexible work patterns such as staggering, overtime, Saturday
work or the like. The extra costs of such patterns are ignored by the
present paper but not by Kraft (1988). But even in our favorable case
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of ignoring Chera, 3 percent less men will be employed than before
hours were shortened.
10. Conclusion
British and German unions are currently pressing for a fully com-
pensated ("mit vollera Lohnausgleich" ) shortening of the working week.
We have found negative effects of such shortening upon employment and
must ask, as Booth-Schiantarelli (1987) do, are unions acting
irrat ionally?
Perhaps they are, or perhaps the explanation is the distinction
between insiders and outsiders. Lindbeck and Snower (1986) and
Blanchard and Summers (1988) distinguish between "insiders," who are
employed hence decision-making, and "outsiders," who are unemployed
hence disenfranchised. Facing deraand-f or-labor functions like our
(3), (8), or (13) the decision-making insiders can have a higher real
wage rate for themselves by accepting less employment of the dis-
enfranchised outsiders. The resulting unemployment is involuntary to
the outsiders but voluntary to the insiders, who accept it with the
better conscience the more generous the unemployment insurance bene-
fits [Casson (1984)]—and the more unemployment is perceived to be
Keynes ian
!
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FOOTNOTES
"Whatever a person saves from his revenue he adds to his capital,
and either employs it himself in maintaining an additional number of
productive hands, or enables some other person to do so, by lending it
to him for an interest...
"What is annually saved is as regularly consumed as what is
annually spent, and nearly in the same time too; but it is consumed by
a different set of people."
2
"There is ... no danger that ... accumulated capital ... would
not find employment. ... There are always to be found in a great
country, a sufficient number of responsible persons, with the
requisite skill, ready to employ the accumulated capital of others,
and to pay them a share of the profits, and which, in all countries,
is known by the name of interest for borrowed money."
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